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March 21, 1998


By Rodney Thayer, Sable Technology Corp.

Security Policy

Network Security: Locking In To Policy

Securing the network means implementing—and enforcing—a comprehensive policy

Airtight. Industrial-strength. Impenetrable. When it comes to security, net managers like to use strong language. Too bad network security policies aren't as tough as the talk.

Fac t is, many net managers see security as something to be determined once, then filed away and forgotten. That might explain not only the layer of dust on those diligently prepared, excruciatingly detailed security policy manuals—but also the state of a typical network: Different devices implement different rules, and different groups work according to conflicting policies. And when a server that offers nearly airtight access control is located next to a firewall that's a lot less discriminating, then the door is open to all kinds of attacks.

Hardly the best way to run a network—but net managers don't have to stick with the scattershot approach. The best way to lock on to security? Unify the various pieces of the policy puzzle. That means making sure that all users and devices adhere to the same set of security rules. It means sharing those rules among devices, preferably via a centralized policy server. And it means cooperating with various parts of the organization to make sure there's a sin gle, agreed-upon security strategy.

It may not be easy. But it's a lot better than letting the dust gather—and leaving the network at risk.

Define the Debate

The problem with most approaches to security policy is that the policies themselves are treated almost as though they're disposable. But policy is not simply a collection of rules that's distributed once and then ignored. Nor is it a set of device configuration parameters that ignore an organization's business processes.

What policy is is the allocation, revocation, and management of permission as a network resource. To put it more simply, it's defining who gets access to what. At a minimum, policy furnishes a list of users authorized to reach some specific resource.

And users aren't necessarily human beings. A user might also be a computer, an IP address, or a specific LAN port on an office wall. For that matter, a resource could be anything users reach via the network. And when someone is dialing up throug h a remote access server, then the network itself is the resource. Of course, a resource also could be something much more specific, like a file server, a directory on that server, a single file, or, in the case of a database, specific fields within a file.

Network managers define policy for a given resource by creating an entry in some sort of access control list. In their most basic form, access control lists are two-dimensional tables that map users to resources.

But today's networks often demand more complex access scenarios. Say a bank installs diskless workstations as next-generation ATMs (automated teller machines). The security policy might stipulate not only that the workstation with Ethernet address X may connect, but also that the workstation may reach the network during banking hours only. And that's just one of the less complex combinations; for example, the workstation might also be configured to accept cash deposits of $500 or less after 3 p.m.

Policy In Parts

Online Extras
Network Security Policy and Procedure


While configuring a single device for even a complex access rule is relatively easy, the same can't be said for configuring multiple devices on a network. Access to network resources tends to be controlled on a component-by-component basis. And when there's no policy infrastructure or unifying set of policy components, things can get difficult.

To make matters worse, different devices implement different parts of security policy. Those at the edge of the corporate network, like firewalls, routers, RASs (remote access servers), and VPN (virtual private network) gear, allow wholesale access. Such devices as proxy servers handle access from within the network to the outside world. And within the network, individual servers and workstations have access cont rols like Windows NT logins and Kerberos tickets.

These controls usually aren't implemented in a way that allows policy to be applied across equipment boundaries. Different devices may offer the same user different levels of access, eliminating any chance of deploying an effective security policy.

This kind of compartmentalization doesn't help in network administration either. When an employee leaves an organization, for example, net managers face the tedious task of finding and reconfiguring all the devices the employee had access to. The piecemeal approach also makes it more difficult to track down network intruders. If an attacker tries to break into a mainframe through a firewall, the attempt may show up in the log of one but not the other.

Multiple points of access, multiple devices controlling policy, and multiple groups enforcing policy. Is it any wonder that implementing an effective, unified policy is so difficult?

On the Same Page

Fortunately, all three of those problems can be addressed. Synchronization is the key: Make sure that all staff and all devices implement the same set of policies.

Start with the issue of multiple points of access. Each device should have the same idea of who is granted access. Network managers can and should set up processes to synchronize different sets of authorized users on various devices. For example, the users in a RAS's access list should be the same as those authorized by the router linking the RAS to these users' various LAN segments. (Besides simplifying administration, synchronization also makes it easier to audit usage.)

But no matter how well synchronized the access lists, policy will always have to be enforced on multiple components. Regardless of the network device involved, there's going to be some sort of database (generically speaking) containing access information. Whenever possible, net managers should set up procedures to allow databases to be combined—or at least compared.

Ideally, t his process can be automated, with devices producing machine-readable versions of their policy databases and exporting them to some central policy server. Policy information would then flow in the opposite direction, out to the various devices in the network. But such systems generally aren't available yet; thus, net managers end up inventing their own policy server through the consolidation process.

While vendors today don't share policy in an interoperable data format, there are several ways net managers can get a jump on unifying access control information. First, use CAs (certificate authorities) and X.509 digital certificates when possible (see "Certificate Authorities: Who Do You Trust?" page 54). A CA is among the most powerful mechanisms available for distributing security policy. Second, employ hardware-based tokens, like smart cards, to ensure that only authorized users gain access to the network. Third, look for an SNMP system that allows for securit y policy changes to be implemented globally, across devices from multiple vendors.

But even if policy databases can't be merged automatically, it's still worth the effort to do so manually. Having them all reside on one management workstation allows for much easier analysis, change control, and auditing.

There's something else to remember when it comes to unifying security policy: Several different groups are likely to be involved, especially in large organizations. Obviously, the easiest approach is for management to mandate that responsibility for policy be coordinated and unified within the organization. Of course, that's not always possible—and where it isn't, setting up an "inter-policy committee" might be wise. It could help ease the tasks that require cooperation, like determining roles during a network attack, major corporate reorganization, or facility change.

Outsourcing is another option. Even if companies can't force their different groups to synchronize policy efforts , it may be possible for all parties to work with one (outsourced) entity that ensures consistency. Yes, this means there's an outsider managing security. But that's a decision some businesses may be willing to make.

Getting it Write

Keeping the need to unify in mind, net managers can then get to work designing the policy itself. This is a two-step process: writing it and then implementing it.

Remember, the policy is essentially a description of the permissions users and systems possess. For users, policy definition issues include the basics—user name, password, directory access rights, resource access rights, and e-mail access rules.

For network devices, policy is more protocol-oriented. Typical issues here are the TCP/IP addresses a device may transmit to or receive from; the applications a device may process; the routes a device is configured to recognize; and the protocols the device will respond to (this is especially useful in handling routing updates and multicas t protocols).

Policy device descriptions have to contain combinations of these elements, resulting in rules like "FTP to this IP address is permitted" or "e-mail from this host is denied." And as network access requirements become more complex, policy has to evolve. An effective security policy might today include rules like "use 40-bit RC4 encryption when transmitting data to the on-campus warehouse, but use Triple-DES [Data Encryption Standard] when transmitting to the remote warehouse."

As for implementing policy, the rule is simple: Policy should be distributed to all devices in the enterprise. Net managers should be able to query any networking device with questions like, "What systems does employee 14937 have access to?" Devices should also share auditing information, such as comparing the number of times a RAS is used on weekends to the number of user logins to a file server during the same period.

Network managers also should be able to distribute policy changes—like move s, adds, and changes—from a central location. Under certain conditions it should be possible to apply policy changes globally by broadcasting them to all devices.

Policy implementation also should address business processes. For example, the routine for terminating an employee shouldn't merely reside on page 289 of volume 17 of the network security operations guide. There also should be software in place to execute a "terminate employee" applet or batch file that sends e-mail and policy update requests to all appropriate systems.

Policy In Place

A unified security policy also is essential when it comes to corporate intranets and extranets. Here it's best to look at an example of each to see how and where policy should be applied.


Figure 1: Defining Intranet Policy

S tart with a typical intranet. A hypothetical company, ABC Sales, has a headquarters office in Boston and 100 branch offices around the U.S. (see Figure 1 ). ABC also has traveling sales representatives who use portable computers. Employees within the company have Internet access for Web browsing, e-mail, and other uses. There's also a public Web site, hosted at the main office. Vendors and customers exchange e-mail and sometimes even large files with the company.

For ABC, mobility is one of the big requirements. If the CEO travels to the Los Angeles sales office, she might want to print a document using her laptop. This means giving her temporary printer access on the Los Angeles network. Typically, there might be a guest cubicle in the sales office, preconfigured with a guest account and network connection. But this isn't the best setup since it allows network access (however limited) to anyone who can reach the guest cubicle. So the CEO might instead use a sm art card that ensures the same access rules apply wherever she plugs in. Of course, the use of smart cards requires a unified policy database—and devices that implement the unified policy.

Meanwhile, back in Boston, employees should be blocked from using the CEO's desktop PC to surf the Web. Centralized policy can help here as well. For example, the network might employ IPsec's user certificates to control access to an external network proxy server. In this scenario, a CA can grant multiple levels of access, like giving full access to executives and more limited, job-related access to other employees.


Figure 2: Defining Extranet Policy

Enforcing policy is hard enough within one organization. But extranets make it even more difficult, since networks are linked with those of customers a nd suppliers (see Figure 2 ).

Consider the ANX project, which links the Big Three U.S. automakers with more than 20,000 suppliers, ranging from giant steelmakers down to mom-and-pop vendors with a single PC and dial-up modem. In this situation, users within different organizations have varying degrees of access to one another's internal systems. Access control usually isn't handled on a companywide basis. Instead, security policies apply to an individual user, like a specific purchasing agent or engineer, or to groups of users, like one entire product design team working with a team in another company.

Implementing security policies across multiple organizations, each using multiple vendors' equipment, is definitely a challenge—but it's not impossible to develop them. Generally speaking, extranet designers give very careful consideration to what information should or should not be flowing across organization boundaries. The result is that security policy might be more explicitly mandated than it is in a single-company scenario. Change control also tends to be more carefully considered, especially as vendors and customers are added to and subtracted from the network.

In the end, net managers should remember that modifications to the network are implicitly policy modifications. To be truly effective, network security policy must evolve as access requirements change.


Rodney Thayer is a consultant with Sable Technology Corp. (Boston) and lead author of the IETF's IP Security Document Roadmap. His e-mail address is rodney@sabletech.com


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